Substitution of hazardous chemicals: A case study in the framework of the project 'Assessing innovation dynamics induced by environment policy' by Oosterhuis, F.H.
Substitution of hazardous chemicals 
A case study in the framework of the project ‘Assessing innovation 
dynamics induced by environment policy’  
 
Frans Oosterhuis 
E-07/03 
November 2006 
This report was commissioned by: Euopean Commission, DG Environment, Contract 
No. 07010401/2005/424497/FRA/G1 
IIVM 
Institute for Environmental Studies 
Vrije Universiteit  
De Boelelaan 1087 
1081 HV Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel. ++31-20-5989 555 
Fax. ++31-20-5989 553 
E-mail: info@ivm.falw.vu.nl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
The author would like to thank the participants in the workshop held on 21 June 2006 in 
Brussels, as well as an anonymous DEFRA staff member, for their comments on a draft 
version of this paper.
Substitution of hazardous chemicals  iii
Contents 
Contents iii 
Abstract v 
Introduction 1 
1. Innovation dynamics of chemicals substitution 3 
1.1 A complex process 3 
1.2 Development of costs and prices 3 
1.3 The role of public policy in relation to other factors 4 
2. Policy instruments for substitution and their effectiveness in selected countries 7 
2.1 Introduction 7 
2.2 Sweden 7 
2.3 Denmark 9 
2.4 USA: The Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Program 10 
2.5 Germany 10 
3. Chemicals substitution and aggregate innovation activity 13 
4. Summary and conclusions 15 
References 17 
 Institute for Environmental Studies iv
 
Substitution of hazardous chemicals  v
Abstract 
This paper addresses the impact of policies that apply the principle of chemicals substitu-
tion on innovations in industry. It finds that public policy has become a major driver for 
innovation in chemicals. Nevertheless, few countries apply a policy of mandatory substi-
tution of hazardous chemicals on environmental grounds. The limited evidence available 
suggests that such policies do not need to be conflicting with innovativeness in the 
chemical industry.  
Several policy instruments can be applied to achieve substitution. Banning a substance 
while allowing exemptions (which in any case have to be granted selectively) will often 
be less cost-effective than a tax. But even direct regulative instruments can be cost-
effective, if designed properly (e.g. obligations to meet certain emission or exposure 
standards or to search for alternatives). In short, the design and implementation are 
probably at least as important as the choice of instrument type.  
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Introduction 
Reducing the risks that chemical substances may cause for people and the environment 
can be achieved in various ways. One of them is the substitution of hazardous chemicals 
by less hazardous alternatives.1 
In EIM (2006) substitution is defined as “the replacement or reduction of hazardous sub-
stances in products and processes by less hazardous or non-hazardous substances, whilst 
achieving an equivalent functionality via technological or organisational measures.” This 
is almost2 the same definition as the one used in a study for DG Environment by Ökopol 
(Lohse et al., 2003). 
As this definition already shows, substitution will often involve not just the replacement 
of one chemical substance by another, less hazardous one, but also other technological 
and/or organisational changes. Functional equivalence is a key element: if the replace-
ment of the chemical leads to lower product quality or to unsurmountable problems with 
the process, one cannot speak of a (successful) substitution. 
In addition to functional equivalence, the following factors will usually play a role in the 
realisation and outcome of a substitution process: 
• The availability of the substitute (i.e. it should be developed and tested to a sufficient 
extent); 
• Availability of information on the substitute and its consequences (including risks 
and uncertainties, as well as gaps in knowledge); 
• Awareness in the organisation of the problems related to the currently used sub-
stance, and preparedness to change; 
• The (investment and operational) costs of the substitute (these should be affordable 
and acceptable for the innovating firm, even though they do not necessarily have to 
be lower than the costs of the current practice: considerations such as better product 
quality, consumer demand, anticipated regulation or a ‘green’ company image may 
justify higher costs); 
• Environmental performance of the substitute (obviously, for a substition to be envi-
ronmentally desirable this performance should be unequivocally better than the cur-
rent practice; tools such as life cycle analysis or substance flow analysis may be 
needed to determine this); 
• The risk of other negative (side) effects, both for the firm itself and for others (these 
may include indirect, cumulative and long term effects). 
Policies aimed at stimulating the substitution of hazardous chemicals will have to ad-
dress these factors so as to make them favourable for the substitution to take place. This 
means that different cases may call for different policy instruments, depending on the 
state of the factors without the policy intervention. For example, if the costs of the sub-
                                                   
1
  A number of other ways to reduce risks from chemicals are included in the principles of 
‘Green Chemistry’ as developed by the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(http://www.epa.gov/greenchemistry/pubs/principles.html, accessed 21 July 2006). 
2
  In Lohse et al.the words ‘or by’ are used instead of the term ‘whilst’. 
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stitute are the main barrier to substitution, a charge on the hazardous chemical could be a 
useful policy instrument. If a lack of awareness or knowledge is the most important fac-
tor, information provision might be the the right instrument. 
Voluntary substitution of hazardous substances is not yet common practice in European 
business.3 An important issue in the current discussions on the REACH proposal is 
therefore the extent to which substitution should be compulsory. In the present case 
study, we will look at some examples of mandatory chemicals substitution legislation, 
and assess to what extent such legislation affects innovative behaviour in industry. On 
the one hand, the influence on actual substitutions is addressed; on the other hand, the 
impact of mandatory substitution on the general innovation performance of the chemical 
industry receives attention. 
This case study focuses on policies that have substitution as their primary objective. Ob-
viously, substitution can also occur as a side effect of other policies. An example is the 
phase out of leaded petrol due to the introduction of the catalytic converter. Substitution 
of hazardous chemicals may also take place as a result of (commercially motivated) in-
novations in which environmental concerns or policy measures do not play a significant 
role. However, the borderline between substitutions induced by environmental policy 
and other substitutions is a grey area: it may be commercially attractive to substitute, for 
example, because environmental concerns create demand for a product containing (or 
made with) less hazardous chemicals. 
The structure of this case study report is as follows. Chapter 1 deals with the dynamics of 
chemicals substitution as an innovation process, addressing its complexity, learning 
curve effects, and the influence of public policy. In Chapter 2, substitution policies in 
some countries and their effects are compared, with specific emphasis on chlorinated 
solvents. Chapter 3 discusses the general impact of substitution policy on the chemical 
industry’s innovative activity. Chapter 4 summarizes and concludes.  
 
                                                   
3
  For example, a recent study by EIRIS (2006) revealed that only two out of seven large 
chemical producers have a commitment to phase-out and/or substitute chemicals of concern 
where feasible as well as to avoid them in the development of new products where possible. 
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1. Innovation dynamics of chemicals substitution  
1.1 A complex process 
Substitution usually pertains to more than just replacing one chemical by another one. 
The difference in properties between the two substances may create the need for other 
changes (technical, but possibly also organisational) as well. Moreover, the hazardous 
substance does not necessarily have to be replaced by another substance. It can also be 
substituted by other means of fulfilling the function it had. Thus, a hazardous cleaning 
agent (e.g. a chlorinated solvent) can be replaced by a less harmful one, but is also con-
ceivable that the product or the production process is redesigned in such a way that the 
cleaning step can be omitted. 
The necessity and desirability of substitution will not only depend on the availability, 
feasibility and costs of the alternative, but also on the function of the hazardous sub-
stance in the production chain. If the substance is only being used by specific firms un-
der controlled circumstances, and the risks for the employees can be minimized by tak-
ing appropriate measures (e.g. using a closed system), the need for substitution may be 
relatively low. On the other hand, if the substance is incorporated in final products 
and/or is being used by a large number of relatively uninformed end users, the risks will 
be much higher and substitution will therefore be more appropriate. 
More generally, cases of chemical substitution can display a wide range of complexity. 
The larger the number of users and applications of a substance and the broader the scope 
of changes involved in the substitution, the more difficult the substitution will be. At the 
same time, however, as noticed in the preceding paragraph, especially these complex 
cases call for substitution, because effective control mechanisms for safe use of the haz-
ardous substance are much more complicated in such cases. 
1.2 Development of costs and prices 
Empirical evidence on the dynamics of costs and prices in the innovation of chemical 
substances appears to be scarce. The main source that could be found is more than 20 
years old, but it may still have relevance as far as the general patterns are concerned. 
Lieberman (1984) studied the development of production costs and prices for 37 chemi-
cal substances during a period from around 1960 until 1972. He found that learning 
curves are a function of cumulated output and cumulated investment rather than calendar 
time. Learning curve effects appeared to be much more important than standard econo-
mies of scale, even though the latter play a major role in the chemical industry. For more 
than half of the sample, the estimated ‘learning curve slope’ was between 70 and 80%, 
i.e. the production costs decreased by 20 to 30% for each doubling of cumulated output. 
The individual learning curves for the 37 substances were remarkably uniform, although 
there were some small but significant differences. In particular, R&D expenditures (or 
the underlying technological opportunities) appeared to steepen the learning curve. For 
the overall sample, prices declined at an average rate of 5.5% per year. In the long term, 
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prices of chemicals closely followed the learning curve, but in the short term market 
power led to a slow-down in price decreases, as might be expected. 
To the extent that substitution involves the replacement of hazardous chemicals by less 
hazardous ones, the evidence on learning curve effects suggests that it may be a self-
reinforcing process: growth in production of the alternative implies cost and price reduc-
tions, making it more attractive for an increasing number of actors. 
1.3 The role of public policy in relation to other factors 
In the past, government policies did not seem to be an important driving force behind in-
novations in the chemical industry. For example, Achilladelis et al. (1990) found that for 
a sample of 203 radical innovations in the chemical industry, only in 12 cases was gov-
ernment legislation considered to be the most important or the only driving force. 
Meanwhile, this situation seems to have changed due to the increasing involvement of 
public policy in the production and use of chemical substances. As far as environmental 
policy is concerned, the phase-out of ozone depleting CFCs is probably the best known 
example of regulation-induced chemicals substitution (see e.g. Vanner, 2006). Obvi-
ously, this regulation (the Montreal protocol and its corollaries) could only be introduced 
after a major player in the chemical industry (DuPont) had developed promising substi-
tutes. This implies the importance of  harnessing diversity in industry: some producers 
stood to gain more from the envisioned regulations than others. Such industry heteroge-
neity may provide opportunities for coalitions of ‘the green and the greedy’ (Maxwell 
and Briscoe, 1997). 
Verschoor and Reijnders (2001) investigated five cases in which companies had applied 
process modifications to reduce toxic chemicals. All of the companies mentioned envi-
ronmental legislation as a reason for process modification, although they all had a (vol-
untary) toxics use reduction strategy.4 
Lohse et al. (2003) also conclude (on the basis of ten case studies) that legislation is one 
of the most powerful drivers, often inducing substitution as a side-effect even where it is 
not explicitly addressed as the main goal. 
Monßen (2005) has investigated a number of environmentally relevant innovations at the 
German chemical company Bayer. Her case studies showed that Bayer’s motivation to 
undertake environmental innovations were primarily determined by external factors: en-
vironmental policy regulation, competitive factors, market demand, or social awareness 
of the need for clean production. In the specific case involving the development of a sub-
stitute chemical (IDS, a biodegradable and less harmful substitute for EDTA as a com-
plexing agent) the main driver was the expected market demand. The large R&D in-
vestment (EUR 25 million between 1992 and 1997) could only be justified from a global 
market perspective. 
In the EIM (2006) study it was found that for the so called SME ‘formulators’ (small and 
medium sized enterprises making intermediate products from chemicals, for professional 
use) legislation and regulation is by far the most important factor behind chemical substi-
                                                   
4
  The environmental legislation involved mainly related to emissions and waste. In one case 
mandatory substitution played a role (ban on the use of carbon tetrachloride). 
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tution. The influence of legislation (in force or anticipated) can be either direct or via 
suppliers or major corporate clients. The SMEs are very dependent on their suppliers of 
basic chemicals. They are usually short term oriented and risk-averse. Therefore, they 
will usually not be the initiators of a substitution process. 
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2. Policy instruments for substitution and their 
effectiveness in selected countries 
2.1 Introduction 
The substitution principle is already incorporated in EU occupational health and safety 
legislation. Directive 98/24/EC (article 6) requires employers to ensure that the risk from 
a hazardous chemical agent to the safety and health of workers at work is eliminated or 
reduced to a minimum. In doing so, substitution should by preference be undertaken, 
whereby the employer should avoid the use of a hazardous chemical agent by replacing 
it with a chemical agent or process which, under its condition of use, is not hazardous or 
less hazardous to workers' safety and health. 
A similar general substitution requirement is presently not in force for environmental 
protection against hazardous chemicals. However, some member states (notably Sweden 
en Denmark) have introduced an ‘environmental’ substitution obligation in their legisla-
tion. In this chapter the application of the substitution principle in these two countries is 
discussed, alongside with an example from the USA. For comparison, the situation in 
Germany is also addressed. The substitution of chlorinated solvents in these countries is 
used as an exemplary case. 
2.2 Sweden 
In Sweden, the substitution principle became part of chemicals legislation already in 
1973 (Löfstedt, 2003). Since 1999 it is known as the ‘product choice principle’, one of 
the cornerstones of the Swedish Environmental Code. Chapter 2, Section 6 of the Envi-
ronmental Code says: “Persons who pursue an activity or take a measure, or intend to do 
so, shall avoid using or selling chemical products or biotechnical organisms that may in-
volve risks to human health or the environment if products or organisms that are as-
sumed to be less dangerous can be used instead. The same requirement shall apply to 
goods that contain or are treated with a chemical product or a biotechnical organism.” 
Applying the substitution principle is facilitated by the Swedish government, for instance 
by means of a database (PRIO) which companies can use to assess their use of hazardous 
substances and possible substitutes.5 
A famous example of the application of the substitution principle in Sweden is the ban 
on trichloroethylene (tri) which was introduced in 1996. The European Court of Justice 
found this ban to be in agreement with EU law (case C-473/98). Nevertheless, the ban 
has met with a lot of opposition, on the one hand because a total ban was considered to 
be disproportional given the relatively minor harmful properties of tri, and on the other 
hand because many industries argued they had no substitute for tri. As a matter of fact, 
exemptions from the ban were made possible for the latter cases. 
                                                   
5
  http://www.kemi.se/templates/PRIOEngframes____4144.aspx. (accessed 21 July 2006). 
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Figure 3.1  Use of trichloroethylene in Sweden, 1978-1999 (source: Slunge and  
Sterner, 2001). 
Figure 3.1 shows the development of the use of tri in Sweden before and after the intro-
duction of the ban. According to Slunge and Sterner (2001) the ban as such has not 
caused the phase-out of tri but might perhaps be considered as the logical last step in a 
phase-out, or it might be thought of as the only instrument capable of stopping the last 
residual uses after other policies have been used (such as emission standards and expo-
sure limits). 
Compared to the approaches in other countries, the Swedish tri ban may not have been 
very effective, as a large number of exemptions to the ban were granted (see Figure 
3.2).6 In Germany, where the emphasis was on technical standards for equipment and 
emissions, industry has invested in modern, ‘closed’ systems for tri use. As a result, the 
specific emissions of tri per euro of value added in the metal industry in Sweden is 90 
times higher than in Germany, whereas in 1993 it was only 9 times higher (Birkenfeld et 
al., 2005).  Major reductions in tri use have also been achieved in Norway, where a tax 
on tri and other chlorinated solvents was introduced in 2000. Purchases of tri in Norway 
fell from more than 500 tonnes in 1999 to 82 tonnes in 2000 and 139 in 2001 (Sterner, 
2004). This reduction is thought to have been driven by efforts to cut leakage and boost 
recycling, as well as through substitution (ENDS, 2003). 
The tri example from Sweden thus seems to suggest that imposing chemical substitution 
by means of a general ban with exemptions may lead to less environmental innovation 
than stimulating substitution by means of financial incentives or regulations aimed at 
limiting exposure and emissions. However, this may be more a matter of instrument de-
sign and implementation than of instrument choice. A ban with exemptions could in 
principle be (cost-)effective if the exemptions are granted selectively, using objective 
criteria, on a temporary basis (possibly with the obligation to investigate alternatives), 
and with efficiency considerations in mind.  
 
                                                   
6
  Nevertheless, the volume of tri use granted under the exemptions has decreased in recent 
years. In 2005, only 111 tons were granted (Birkenfeld et al., 2005). Firms that receive an 
exemption have to search actively for alternatives. 
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Figure 3.2  Relative rates of reduction in tri use in Sweden, Norway and Germany (1986 
= 100) (source:Slunge and  Sterner, 2001). 
2.3 Denmark 
Danish occupational health and safety legislation requires the replacement of hazardous 
substances or materials by less hazardous ones.7 This substitution is compulsory even if 
the effects of the hazardous substances are insignificant. The law provides for exemp-
tions if substitution is technically impossible or prohibitively expensive. 
In addition, the Danish Environmental Protection Agency has published a ‘List of Unde-
sirable Substances’. These substances (more than 8,000) are not banned, but their substi-
tution is being encouraged. In 2003, a website was launched containing more than 200 
examples of substitutions in different companies.8 
Substitution of hazardous chemicals in Denmark is also promoted by means of economic 
instruments. For example, environmental taxes are levied on pesticides, chlorinated sol-
vents, CFCs, nickel-cadmium batteries, soft PVC and phthalates. There is some evidence 
for the effectiveness of these taxes (Ecological Council, 2002). According to a Danish 
cable producer, which has replaced PVC with phthalates by halogen-free polymers in 
part of its products, the taxes on PVC and phthalates have helped to lessen the price dif-
ference (Ecological Council, 2006). The tax on chlorinated solvents, though much lower 
than the Norwegian tax on the same substances, contributed to a decrease in the use of 
these substances by 60% (Sterner, 2004). 
In general, the reasons for companies in Denmark to engage in substitution processes, as 
well as their experiences with it, show a wide variety, as the Ecological Council (2006) 
report reveals.   
                                                   
7
  Executive order 292 of April 26, 2001 on Work with Substances and Materials (quoted in 
Ecological Council, 2006). 
8
  www.catsub.dk (accessed 21 July 2006). 
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2.4 USA: The Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Program 
The Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act (TURA) of 1989 requires that manufactur-
ing firms using specific quantities of some 900 industrial chemicals undergo a biyearly 
process to identify alternatives to reduce waste and the use of those chemicals.9 Through 
the toxics use reduction planning process firms understand why they use a specific 
chemical (what ‘service’ it provides), and how it is used in the production process. They 
also conduct a systematic search for and comprehensive financial, technical, environ-
mental, and occupational health and safety analysis of viable alternatives. The act in-
structs firms to identify ways to redesign production processes and products and pro-
vides six different methods that ‘count’ as toxics use reduction (including chemical sub-
stitution, for example replacement of a chlorinated solvent with an aqueous one; process 
change, for example use of high pressure paint applicators; product change, for example 
using a different plastic to avoid the use of phthalates; and improved management, for 
example upgrading equipment and procedures to more effectively manage chemical 
flows) (Tickner et al., 2005). 
Between 1990 and 2000, some 550 firms that have continuously participated in the pro-
gram have reduced the use of the targeted toxic chemicals by 40% (Tickner and Geiser, 
2004, Appendix A). According to O’Rourke and Lee (2004), mandatory planning, new 
mechanisms of accountability and improved processes of learning have all been critical 
to TURA’s success in motivating firms to innovate for the environment.  
The Massachusetts TUR program has designated tri as one of five high priority sub-
stances that are to receive special attention, with the aim of attaining significant reduc-
tion in use. In 2004 a project was started, targeted at smaller businesses using tri, who do 
not have direct access to pollution prevention information and resources (TURI, 2006).  
2.5  Germany 
The German Ordinance on dangerous substances (Gefahrstoffverordnung) states (in § 
9(1)) that employers should undo or minimize the dangers for the health and safety of 
their employees caused by hazardous substances, preferably by performing a substitu-
tion. A decision not to substitute has to be motivated. The German substitution principle 
is thus primarily based on occupational health and safety considerations.   
There are doubts about the effectiveness of this general substitution clause. Especially in 
SMEs the substitution principle is hardly turned into own initiatives (SubChem, 2004). 
As indicated in the preceding sections, the German approach to chlorinated solvents has 
differed from the approach taken in Sweden (a ban with exemptions) and Norway and 
Denmark (taxation). The German approach focused on risk reduction through the intro-
duction of ‘closed’ systems for the use of chlorinated solvents. As a result of this policy, 
Germany did not only achieve substantial decreases in solvent use, but also became a 
leading exporter of high-quality closed-loop degreasing equipment (Sterner, 2004). This 
                                                   
9
  Tickner and Geiser (2004, Appendix A) mention a number of 190 chemicals. 
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can be seen as an illustration of ‘first mover advantages’ and the famous ‘Porter hy-
pothesis’ (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995).
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3. Chemicals substitution and aggregate innovation 
activity 
Within the framework of the present study it is of course impossible to make a profound 
analysis of the relationship between mandatory substitution of hazardous chemicals and 
innovative activity. Nevertheless, we can tentatively look for some evidence, for instance 
by measuring the difference in R&D activity between EU countries with an explicit (en-
vironmentally motivated) substitution policy and those without. As Table 4.1 shows, the 
innovative activity in the chemical industry in Denmark and Sweden (the two EU coun-
tries having a mandatory chemicals substitution policy on environmental grounds, as we 
have seen in Chapter 3) is substantially higher than in other EU countries. 
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 Source: Own calculations based on OECD (R&D data) and Eurostat (value added data). 
Figure 4.1  Own (intramural) expenditure on R&D by the chemical industry in 13 ‘old’ 
EU countries, in % of gross value added (average of years in 2000-2003 for 
which data are available). 
Obviously, the reasons for the high R&D level in Denmark and Sweden can be manifold. 
Labour market conditions, dominance of specialty rather than bulk chemicals, and the 
general innovative climate probably make these countries relatively attractive for R&D 
activities. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the substitution policy they pursue at 
least does not seem to deter innovation in the chemical industry. 
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In a global perspective, Mahdi et al. (2002) found that there is no unambiguous evidence 
that the innovation performance of the European chemical industry is significantly below 
that in the USA, despite the fact that European regulation is more stringent and less 
flexible. The introduction of new regulations can cause an initial ‘innovation-shock’ to 
the industry which decreases the rate of innovation, but competitive and innovative firms 
survive through creative substitution and by moving into higher value markets.  
One should keep in mind that it is not only the chemical industry that is involved in in-
novations regarding chemicals substitution. In particular, companies using hazardous 
chemicals in their processes or in the products they make will be affected by substitution 
policies. Such companies are spread over a wide range of industries, and they are often 
SMEs. An analysis of the innovative performance of these industries and companies in 
relation to chemicals substitution policies is beyond the scope of this study. 
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4. Summary and conclusions 
Substitution of hazardous chemicals occurs in a wide variety of forms and for a wide va-
riety of reasons. Therefore it is impossible to formulate general statements or conclu-
sions about the typical course of a substitution process, or on how it can be stimulated. 
Nevertheless, it may be possible to identify some features that many substitution cases 
seem to share. 
Substitution is a complex process. It usually pertains to more than just replacing one 
chemical by another one: other changes (technical, but possibly also organisational) may 
be involved as well.  
Learning curve effects are quite important in the development of chemical substances. 
Typically, production costs decrease by 20 to 30% for each doubling of cumulated out-
put. This means that substitution may be a self-reinforcing process: growth in production 
of the alternative implies cost and price reductions, making it more attractive for an in-
creasing number of actors. 
Despite the large diversity of substitution processes, motives and actors involved, it is 
obvious that public policy is a major driver to bring about environmentally benign inno-
vations in the production and use of chemicals. Instrument choice seems to affect the 
(cost-)effectiveness of the policy. Banning a substance while allowing exemptions will 
often be less cost-effective than a tax (as the Swedish tri case shows, in comparison with 
Norway). But even if the policymaker prefers direct regulation, differences in instrument 
design can lead to quite different results. Obligations for a firm to meet certain emission 
or exposure standards (as in Germany) or to search for alternatives (as in Massachusetts) 
may be more effective in terms of achieving substitution than an outright ban on the haz-
ardous substance (with exemptions, as in Sweden). In any case, exemptions to a ban 
should be granted selectively, using objective criteria, on a temporary basis (possibly 
with the obligation to investigate alternatives), and with efficiency considerations in 
mind. In short, the design and implementation of a policy instrument may be at least as 
important as the choice of instrument type. 
The available evidence does not reveal a conflict between stringent environmental re-
quirements (including mandatory substitution of hazardous chemicals) and the rate of in-
novation in the chemical industry. There are even indications that in countries pursuing 
an active environmentally motivated substitution policy (Sweden, Denmark) the innova-
tion activity in the chemical industry is higher than elsewhere. Obviously, however, the 
nature and direction of innovation will be affected as companies are confronted with the 
need to search for creative solutions to reduce the use of harmful chemicals. 
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